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Select Cases and Other Authorities on the Law of Trusts. By
Austin Wakeman Scott. Second Edition. Cambridge: Austin
Wakeman Scott. 1931. pp: xiv, 818. $6.
THE orginal edition of'this popular casebook is herein thoroughly and skill-
fully revised. One has the impression that each item-almost every word-
has been carefully selected and arranged, not merely in 'the choice of the
cases and the construction of the footnotes, but also in the editing of the
decisions 1printed, which have been vigilantly pruned. Perhaps the study
of the subject is thus somewhat over-simplified. Perhaps, however, this is
counterbalanced by the increase in enthusiasm for reading that able guid-
ance and absence of irrelevancies may well produce. Variations from the
first edition, however, while important, are chiefly in details; no substantial
departure from its fundamental assumptions is apparent.
There is some rearrangement of the material, especially of that concerned
with the administration of trusts, but the basic structure of the book Is
essentially the same. The total number of cases included has been slightly
increased. About one-quarter of those in the first edition have been aban-
doned; a little less than one-third of those in the present edition are now.
Many, though not all, of the latter have been decided since the publication
of the first edition, and important and interesting recent decisions have
been included in whole or in part.' Preference for cases from certain juris-
dictions is again manifest. The percentage of English cases has been re-
duced from fifty-four to forty-three; a far more drastic reduction would
seem desirable in the light of student reactions. Cases from Massachusetts,
New York, New Jersey, and the Federal Courts have been somewhat in-
creased. The total result is that in this edition, as in the former one, ap-
proximately four-fifths of the cases are selected from the five jurisdictions
named. The footnotes have been thoroughly revised. Much important mate-
rial has been published since the appearance of the origial edition, including
Mr. Bogert's text and a mass of significant comment in the law reviews,
notably Mr. Scott's own articles. This has made it possible for the editor
in many instancds to reduce the footnotes into more compact and attractive
form, with discriminating references to law reviews, texts, annotations, the
notes of the first edition, and important cases. Those who know where to
look in this casebook will find very expeditious leads into the authorities.
There are some minor issues, obviously controversial, on which I disagree.
I would prefer not to comnience the course by attempting to distinguish "a
trust" from "a bailment," "a trust obligation" from "a liability for a tort,"
etc. The enthusiasm of other teachers for this mode of approach is appre-
ciated. And it would be clearly inadvisable to restrict discussion in this field
to trust doctrine alone. But this traditional introduction to the subject
1 For example, Chase National Bank v. Sayles, 11 F. (2d) 948 (C. C. A.
1st, 1926) ; Wittmeier v. Heiligenstein, 308 Ill. 434, 139 N. E. 871 (1923) ;
Whittemore v. Equitable Trust Company, 250 N. Y. 298, 165 N. E. 454
(1929) ; Foreman v. Foreman, 251 N. Y. 237, 167 N. E. 428 (1929) ; Moin-
hard v. Salmon, 249 N. Y. 458, 164 N. E. 545 (1928) ; Fur & Wool Trading
Co., Ltd. v. Fox, Inc., 245 N. Y. 215, 156 N. E. 670 (1927).
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seems to me to require comparison on an artificial plane of concepts difii-
cult to define in the abstract. There is valuable material in this first chapter,
but it appears out of place. Secondly, I disfavor the use in such a course as
this of the time-consuming teaching vehicle of the earlier English cases.
However, these questions are perhaps comparatively unimportant. There
is ample material in this able book for a course on Trusts, and individual
instructors can make such rearrangements as they desire.
There is a more important issue. I definitely disagree with the basic
assumption that a separate course on "Trusts" is desirable, and propose to
experiment with the contrary hypothesis. The great diversity and scope
of the decisions employing trust language are familiar, and a major and
highly controversial problem of classification for curricular and other pur-
poses is presented. Any very intelligible discussion would require much
greater elaboration than seems appropriate here. An attempt will be made,
however, to suggest some of the reasons for a change. We are primarily
interested in the actual results of judicial action in given situations, and
it therefore seems that all available factors relevant to a particular pre-
diction or inquiry should be considered at the same time. The existing ar-
rangement seems to prohibit that and to make incomplete the consideration
of particular issues both in the Trusts course and in others. In other word-,
the basis for curricular classification should be the situation rather than
the legal concept. A peculiarly convenient general situation on which to
focus is that of gratuitous non-commercial disposition of wealth. It in-
volves closely related legal techniques, and no great upheaval in the curric-
ulum at large need be occasioned. Such a change of emphasis would also
make it possible to condense the present Wills material and merge it with
materials of higher intellectual content. And I do not believe that an ade-
quate appreciation by the student of the broad existing and potential utility
of the trust device need be lost in the process. Signs of unrest with the
existing order of things are apparent elsewhere. Mr. Carey's recent case-
book is an example. And the proposals referred to here are probably har-
monious with some of the hypotheses underlying Mr. Richard Powell's de-
velopments at Columbia; the tentative arrangement, however, is understood
to be quite different. I would favor including in one course the substantive
law of intestate succession, outright gifts, wills, and that large part of the
existing course on Trusts that concerns gratuitous transfers; and in an-
other and separate course the problems that arise in the management of
decedent and trust estates by executors, administrators and trustees. No
change in the course on Future Interests is suggested.
Mr. Scott's book is avowedly constructed on different assumptions. The
care and skill of the editor cannot be denied. If the validity of its funda-
mental hypotheses can be assumed, it is one of our best casebooks.
Yale University. ASHBEL Gari GuLuivun
Cases on the Law of Taxation. By Roswell Magill and John Al.
Maguire. Chicago: Commerce Clearing House, Inc. 1931. pp.
xix, 950.
NEARLY a decade has elapsed 'since the subject of taxation began to be
fairly generally recognized as entitled to a place in the law school curric-
2 Compare Arnold, The Restatenwnt of the Law of Triust (1931) 31 COL.
L. REv. 800; Scott, The Restatement of the Law of Trusts (1931) 31 COL.
L. REV. 1266.
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ulum on a par with course 1 of long standing. This was no doubt due In a
measurable degree to the widespread interest in the whole matter of taxa-
tion resulting from the increasing burden of governmental expenditures
of both state and federal governments. The first case-book on the subject
had been published in the early years of the twentieth century, but since
that time tax systems had undergone considerable changes, including a
trend toward income taxes, or taxes measured by income factors, and an
increased reliance among the states on inheritance taxes. A vast body of
case law interpreting state inheritance tax statutes and federal estate
and income tax acts had grown up. There had also been an extensive de-
velopment of case law on the limitations imposed by state and federal
constitutional provisions on exercises of the states' taxing powers, The
compilation of a case-book to cover the subject today requires infinitely
more judgment than was required at the turn of the century. It is quite
impossible adequately to appraise a selection of cases on taxation today
without taking into consideration the difficult tasks of selecting problems
to be considered and the cases to be chosen to develop those problems that
confront those who would essay the task. It is with a. full appreciation of
those difficulties that the reviewer approaches his task of appraising the
present volume of cases.
The case-book under review opens with a chapter on the legitimate pur-
poses of taxation. Here it considers not only the doctrine of public purpose
but also the question of the extent to which the taxing power can function
as an instrument for attaining objectives other than the raising of govern-
mental revenues. It is here also that the problem of territorial uniformity
is briefly, treated. The cases illustrating the first problem above referred
to are too few adequately to develop the judicial process in dealing with
this subject, and to indicate the factors that have achieved judicial recog-
nition as relevant to the issue of public purposes. The material dealing
with the second, problem is both adequate and selected with excellent judg-
ment and discrimination. The reviewer, however, is inclined to consider the
treatment at this point of the problem of territorial uniformity as of
doubtful utility. The principal issue in cases of that character is the dis-
tribution of the tax burden, even though the principle applied is some-
times stated in terms of the purpose for which a tax in a given tax district
can be imposed.
The balance of the compilation is devoted to the treatment of the prin-
cipal taxes with which lawyers will most probably be called upon to deal.
The general property tax is first considered. The general approach Is to
treat the questions in the order in which occur the steps in the process by
which the governmental authority imposing the tax proceeds in fixing the
liability. The bulk of the materials in the chapter on levy and assessment
deal with the problem of notice and hearing in these connections, and the
cases are excellently chosen. The section on jurisdiction in the next chapter
contains many of the important cases in which the United States Supreme
Court has passed on this problem. The cases, however, do not seem to be
grouped in the order best adapted to develop the problem and the law
developed in response thereto. The treatment of the problem of exemptions
might have merited more cases than have been devoted to it. The section
on disproportionate assessment is very well done, but that on classification
is not particularly strong. It is in his treatment of the designation and
the valuation of property for taxation that the author of this part of the
text achieves a high standard. The footnote material is especially well
conceived and executed at this point. His material on the icollection of
taxes and on taxpayers' remedies also achieves an excellent standard. The
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cases dealing with it are well chosen and bring out some excellent problems
involving matters of fundamental importance.
The treatment of the general property tax is followed by two chapters
devoted to excise taxes. *The first of these is devoted to cases illustrating
the general nature of such taxes, and this is followed by a very extensive
treatment of modern excise taxes on business concerns. This chapter con-
tains a good selection of the cases in which the United States Supreme
Court has dealt with impositions of this character in relation to the com-
merce, due process and equal protection clauses of the Federal Constitution.
The mere fact that a considerable part of this subject matter is generally
covered quite fully in courses in constitutional law need not detract in the
least degree from recognizing that Professor Maguire has here assembled
a fine collection of materials for the treatment of these taxes from the
angle represented by these cases. It might, however, have been desirable,
if these taxes were to be as extensively treated as has been here done, to
have raised some problems of their measurement other than those involving
points of federal constitutional law.
Inheritance and estate taxes are next considered. The classification of
the materials follows approved lines and that which is naturally dictated
by the necessity for presenting the law as to these taxes. It would have
seemed desirable to illustrate the problem of retroactivity by cases involv-
ing more than one type of transfer to which these taxes apply, even though
many of the cases involving other kinds of transfer are referred to and
briefly discussed in the dissenting opinion in one of the cases set out in full.
They do not, however, fully inform the student of the general problems in
connection with which the problem of retroactivity becomes significant. In
the selection of cases to illustrate the property and transfers subject to
inheritance taxes, and the property includable in the gross estate in com-
puting the federal estate tax, the transfer in contemplation of death has
been accorded a relative importance not justified by the legal difficulties
raised by it. This seems to have been done at an undue slighting of such
other types of transfers as those occurring under powers of appointment
and those intendedrto take effect in possession or enjoyment at death, and
the complete ignoring of transfers incident to the death of a joint tenant
or a tenant by the entirety. The section devoted to deductions contains
sufficient material to raise the significant and difficult problems connected
with this part of the tax computation, although a case or two involving
the problem of marshalling would have added to its effectiveness as a
teaching device.
The last part of the compilation is devoted to the income tax. The por-
tions devoted to setting forth the constitutional limitations on both the
federal government and the states contain an excellent collection of mate-
rials. The problem of the limits imposed on each of these governments by
the principle that neither can so use its taxing powers as to impede unduly
the functioning of the other has been illustrated at greater length than
would seem necessary in view of its treatment in courses in constitutional
law. This emphasis would be justified unless purchased at the sacrifice'of
other problems not treated in other courses, but this is a ratherl difficult
thing to achieve unless publishers will forego their not unnatural insistence
that a case-book must be kept within a reasonable length. The authors'
treatment of taxable persons is very adequate, and the cases are in general
well chosen. The same is true of the section dealing with problems of
determining gross income, but here the order might have been changed so
as to develop the problems more clearly. The problems of deductions from
gross income in arriving at net income that the author has selected cover
significant points of the law, but one can only wish that he had made a
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wider selection. The income tax part, however, includes sufficient material
to form the basis for'a sound exposition of this tax.
There remain several features of the compilation that deserve to be
commented upon. The authors have adopted the' device of setting forth
problems at many places in their text, and indicating the cases in which
answers can be found. They have wisely refrained from giving the an-
swers. The authors' theory is undoubtedly that the students' curiosity will
be aroused 'more successfully by this means than by the reference to other
cases and problems in footnotes. It is the reviewer's sincere wish that
experience may prove the theory sound. The resort to this device is much
more marked in the first parts of the book than in those dealing with the
inheritance and income taxes. The footnote materials are valuable, but
do'not contain as many references to articles in law reviews as the mate-
rials therein found warrant. Nor does the compilation contain as many
references to non-legislative and non-judicial matter as the reviewer had
been led to expect from the reference thereto in the Introduction. On the
whole, however, the compilation of cases that Professors Magill and lMva-
guire have made is of high quality, and fully adequate to meet the needs of
those whose curriculum permits them to devote to taxation the time it morits
but' does not generally receive.
University of Minnesota. HENRY ROTTSCAEFEt.
Adatrechtbundels. Indonesian Customary Law Volumes. Vol-
umes 32, 33. Edited by the Committee for "adat" law at
Leiden. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. 1930. 1931. pp. vii,
468; ix, 482, £5:50.
THESE two volumes are the latest of the great series on Indonesian cus-
tomary law, of which the first was published in 1911. Originally begun
on a small scale by a few Dutch scholars as a collection of customary law
of the Dutch East Indies, the project has grown in scope and in signifi-
cance and has finally become a study covering the whole area of Indonesian
culture, including Formosa, the Philippines, New Guinea, Timor, Borneo,
the Malay Peninsula, the Chain States, and Madagascar. The work begun
by the Committee on Customary Law in 1909 under the chairmanship of
Professor C. Snouch Hurgronge with Professor Cvan Vollenhoven, who
originated the idea, acting as his secretary, has grown to international
dimensions. Committees on Customary Law in other countries having pos-
sessions in Indonesian culture area cooperated with the Committee in Hol-
land and the project has received the sympathy and support of the Union
Academique Internationale at Brussels.
Volume 32 is devoted to South Sumatra. It contains illustrations of
agrarian and riparian law and gives samples of the rights of individuals
in the commons and the waste of the village communities. Marriage cus-
toms and family law are well represented and there are several sections on
what'imight be called public law, dealing with the appointment and selec-
tion of village chieftains and their relations to the prince.
The most interesting section of the book, if one is permitted to be enter-
tained by so weighty a volume, is the section dealing with titles of nobility,
rank, honour and distinction. For the people who seem somewhat worried
about possible connections between large contributions to party campaign
funds and the subsequent acquisition of title by the patriotic donor, it is de-
lightfully refreshing to find a country where everything is open and above.




careful detail the exact cost of each and all of the honours which the state
has to bestow. The simple citizen has the knowledge that financial success
will enable him to buy honour and distinction, and he can be certain that
he will get his money's worth. There is no danger that the party to which
he contributes may fail in the election. There is a wide range of desirable
honours to choose from. The state does not only cater to the masculine
element of its citizenry, it also offers a wide range of bargains to the ladies.
For the payment of one buffalo and ten dollars she can choose between the
right to wear a yellow or a white shawl or the right to fire two guns either
simultaneously or in succession. There is an appeal both to the sporting
young flapper and the vamp of older vintage. To the latter the state offers
the right to dance on a tray under two umbrellas in payment for one slave,
one buffalo and thirty-two dollars.
This recognition and acceptance of the fundamental human desire for
honour and distinction ought to be an inspiration to the modern taxation
experts. If the gentlemen in Washington who are straining their ingenuity
in thinking up new taxes to cover our billion dollar deficit will copy this
excellent practice of selling honours our financial worries would soon be
over. There must be thousands of middle aged matrons in this country
who would be willing to pay round sums for a federal authorization to
dance on tea trays.
Volume 33, which is not devoted to one area, but which contains a mis-
cellaneous collection from different countries, contains a chapter on the
agrarian law in Hawaii and some very interesting information on primitive
forms of cooperation.
These volumes, like their predecessors, contain data of the utmost im-
portance to the ethnologist, socialist, and the student of primitive law.
One is impressed by the numerous cases which suggest similarities to the
early law of Europe. This mass of material therefore provides enough
ammunition to keep the family fight between the diffusionist and the
evolutionist going for fifty years. But what is perhaps of more interest to
the student of law is the fact that these books clearly convey that the as-
sumed stability of primitive society is not as great as we have thought.
This means that the problem between the rigidity of legal rule and the ever
changing social setting is eternal and universal. Primitive customary law,
contrary to many opinions, is an instrument of marvelous flexibility, but
the moment there begins statement in writing or simple codification, there
arises the problem of rigidity and of the relation between law in the books
and law in action. The problem of how to adapt legal norms to changing
social life is a problem which even the savages are not spared.
Yale University. N. J. SPiKmi,.
The Main I1ititutions of Roman Private Law. By W. W. Buck-
land. Cambridge: The University Press. New York: The
Macmillan Co. 1931. pp. xii, 410. $5.
THIs book with the Text-Book of Roman Law (1921) and the Maal of
Ronn Private Law (1925) forms the third of a series of handbooks which
the eminent Cambridge Romanist has prepared and which justify the
statement of 1i. Georges Cornil that Mr. Buckland's work on Roman law
is hors pair among works on this subject in English. It takes the place of
his Elementary Principler of Roman Private Law, a book which gave many
of us the uneasy feeling that if that is what Mr. Buckland believed to be
elementary, very few scholars indeed would qualify for the position of
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advanced students. The matter is completely reorganized. The expression
is clear, definite and precise. Theories are presented, criticized and approved
or rejected and the whole is suffused with the full learning and the judicial
temper which Mr. Buckland has accustomed us to expect of him. It is an
admirable summary of Roman law, supplementing the Text-Book somewhat,
just as the Manual did, and differing from the latter chiefly in the tone and
general purpose. It may be said that the "Main Institutions" reaches out
a little further into the contacts of the law with history than the "Manual"
did, and is less directly didactic.
An illustration might be found in the difference between the discussion
of family settlements in the Manual [p. 225] and that in the Institutions
[pp. 232-233]. In the former, Novel 159 is directly referred to, but the
enormous range of influence of the family settlement is not alluded to. In
the latter, the Novel is not specifically mentioned, but the case itself, as
stated in the Novel, is set forth, and with it, its fruition in the "family
fideicommissum," est institucion funesta, as old Escriche called it-as well
as its probable bearing on the famous statement of Bereford in Belyng'a
case.'
It is unnecessary to speak of the accuracy of the book under review.
Mr. Buckland differs from other scholars on a number of specific questions.
In most of them, I am persuaded that he is right and in all of them hip
authority would equal that of his opponents, si auctoritatibus contondondurt
est. And, in my opinion, the sanity and balance he has always observed on
the matter of interpolations-most explicitly set forth in his article, "In-
terpolations In The Digest" 2 -far outweigh the brilliant ingenuity with
which the pontiffs of the interpolation theory have dazzled the imaginations
of a laborious and misled generation. It is hard to see how a statement
like that of the preface [p. xi] that "the period from A. D. 180 to A. D. 280
was far more constructive and the 'Byzantine' age far less constructive, in
private law, than is commonly supposed," can fail tot put the issue, as it
should be put, on the basis of historical probabilities, and shift the onus of
proof where it belongs.
Mr. Buckland's few references are sign-posts rather than full citations,
as he indicates in advance. Obviously, in a book intended to give a con-
spectus of a whole legal system, full citation of authorities is impossible
But the citations in crucial cases are sufficiently numerous to indicate to
the student where he must look for complete information.
It is likely enough that some readers will find the "Institutions" a hard
book, just as they found the "Elementary Principles" a particularly hard
one. But it certainly will not be for the same reason. The earlier book
was hard because it presupposed considerable familiarity with the sub-
ject. This one will seem hard to a Latin-less generation, not merely be-
cause Mr. Buckland uses the Latin terms for the Roman institutions-he
could scarcely do otherwise-but in part because he uses Latin phrases
and tags which are left untranslated. Doubtless he assumed that those
whose crass unfamiliarity with the ancient society implied makes them
unable to understand these phrases would do well to leave the Roman law
alone.
Otherwise the book is hard only because it is crammed with matter. We
are accustomed to getting our food in a more diluted form. But it can cer-
tainly be no reproach to Mr. Buckland that he rates our capacities highly,
We might learn to deserve it.
University of California. MAX RADIN.
I Y. B. 5 Ed. II.
2 (1924) 33 YALE L. J. 343.
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Constitutional Law. By E. C. S. Wade and G. Godfrey Phillips.
New York: Longmans, Green and Co. 1931. pp. m.ii, 476. $8.
An Introduction to British Costitition-l Law. By Arthur B.
Keith. New York: Oxford University Press. 1931. pp. xii,
243. $2.50.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW is an elaborate digest on the English Constitution
prepared by two experienced tutors for the use of university students. As
the work is designed primarily for teaching the subject, tTie authors make
free use of outlines, of marginal notations, of references to topics treated
in other sections, and to cases and statutes. All these devices give the pages
at first sight a somewhat repellent aspect to the layman. But if he ill
persevere, he will find that the book contains a clear, interesting, thought-
ful and stimulating discussion of the present constitution and its underlying
principles, and the changes which have developed during the past fifty
years since the appearance of Dicey's Law of thw Costitution. They bring
out sharply the astonishing expansion of the administrative system during
that period, in complexity, in number of officials and in power. To such
a degree has it grown that Dicey's dogmas concerning the Rule of Law, for
example, need considerable modification. This is the "new despotism" that
has arisen. The book also contains abundant citations of secondary works
that the authors have employed, which those who care to go more deeply
into the subject may study, and numerous references to cases and statutes,
particularly those in the period since 1900.
While the treatment of the subject is thorough and comprehensive, the
work can be used to advantage by the beginner as well as by the advanced
student. It is a notable case of textbook-making in the best style.
Professor Keith's little book, called an "introduction," is a brief text
which aims to present "a preliminary view of the doctrines which are set
outdn detail in the classical treatises." It omits local government (a not-
able defect in such a work today), but as we would expect, it devotes justi-
fiably considerable space to imperial topics. An "introduction" to a difficult
subject is the hardest kind of book to write and the author has hardly de-
voted enough attention to the problem of presentation. While the book has
much merit, it is for a beginner not clear, omits essential details and ex-
planations, and contains sundry incorrect or doubtful generalizations;
broadly speadng,.it is a volume with a great variety of observations some-
what casually thrown together into chapters. It is really of more value
to the advanced student than to the beginner.
Yale University. SYDNEY K. MITCHELL.
Derecho Interwxioid Privado. By Antonio Sanchez de Busta-
mante Y. Sirven. Three volumes. Havana: Carasa & Co. 1931.
pp. 453; 508; 551.
IN 1896 Dr. Bustamante published the first volume of a treatise on private
international law containing, in addition to the history of the subject, what
he called certain "preliminary notions" dealing with the nature of the sub-
ject and current doctrines. This treatise was never completed. Special
monographs by the same author have appeared on various subjects, the
most important ones of which are El Orde PuLbl ko, published in 1893, and
La Awtarquia Personal, published in 1914. In recent times Dr. Bustamante
published various volumes relating to the codification of private interna-
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tional law. These efforts culminated in the "Code Bustamante," adopted by
the Pan-American Conference at Havana in 1928, and in force today in
Brazil, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala,
Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, and Peru.
The Code itself consists of a preliminary title and four books containing
four hundred and thirty-seven articles. Book I, entitled International Civil
Law, deals with the Law of Persons (Articles 1-104), the Law of Prop-
erty (Articles 105-139), Various Modes of Acquisition (Articles 141-163),
and Obligations and Contracts (Articles 164-231). Book II (Articles 232-
293) is devoted -to International Commercial Law, Book III (Articles 290-
313) to International Penal Law, and Book IV (Articles 314-437) to Inter-
national Law of Procedure.
The first volume of the present work covers substantially the same ground
as Dr. Bustamante's Treatise, El Orden Publico and La Autarquia Pel'sonal.
The second volume deals with the subject matter contained in Books I and
II of the Code Bustamante, that is, with international civil and commerclal
law, and Volume III, with Books III and IV of the Code Bustamante, that
is, with international penal law and procedure. In the second and third
volumes, the order of the subjects is identical with the one followed in the
Code.
According to Dr. Bustamante, the scope of the subject of private inter-
national law is a two-fold one. It should indicate what foreign laws should
be recognized as operative within a certain state or country, but in addition
it should set out the limits within which, from an international point of
view, the legislation of such state or country should be confined. With
respect to nationals residing in their own country, the local laws, according
to our author, are either supplementary or imperative. With respect to
foreigners residing in a country, the local laws are either imperative, sup-
plementary or inapplicable, and with respect to nationals living in a foreign
country, the laws of his country are either inapplicable, personal, supple-
mentary or voluntary. With respect to foreigners not residing in the country
whose laws are in question, such laws may be either voluntary or supple-
mentary, imperative or inapplicable. All laws may be divided, therefore,
into three classes. First, those applying to persons by reason of their domi-
cil or other nationality and following them even when they go to another
country-termed personal or of an internal public order. Second, those
binding alike upon all persons residing in the territory, whether or not they
are nationals-termed territorial, local, or of an international public order.
Third, those applying only through the expression, interpretation, or pre-
sumption of the will of the parties or of one of them-termed voluntary or
of a private order. Dr. Bustamante's ideas regarding this classification were
fully developed in El Orden Publico and La Autarquia Personal, and set
forth in a more summary form on pages 187 to 285 of Volume I of the
present work.
Dr. Bustamante has given us a new approach to the solution of the con-
flict of laws, which is important, not only because of the preeminence of
the author in the field of public and private international law, but also be-
cause it is embodied in the Code Bustamante, which is in force in many of
the Latin-American countries. To have written a code of private Interna-
tional law in accordance with his own ideas on the subject, and to have
had it adopted as law by so many states is indeed an accomplishment which
will give to Dr. Bustamante at all times a unique place among the writers
on the conflict of laws.
Volumes II and III are devoted to an exposition of the Code Bustamiante,
In his previous publications relating to the Code, considerable light was
thrown upon its provisions, but no commentary upon the Code as a whole
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existed until the publication of the present work. Volumes II and In indi-
cate why, from the author's point of view, the rules laid down in the Code
are the proper ones. The precise meaning of the rules and their application
to concrete cases do not, however, always appear suiciently, at least to a
reader trained in Anglo-American law. Very frequently he is left in doubt,
and this is almost universally the case when a particular law is said to be
"territorial," "local," or "of an international public order." Does it refer
to the country in which the act was done, or to the country in which the
property is situated, or to the country in which suit is brought?
The object of the work being an elucidation of the Code Bustamante, no
reference is made in Volumes II and III to the views of other writers; nor
are comparisons made between the rules laid down in the Code and those
prevailing in other countries. The author, however, does point out, where-
ever possible, the operation of the rules of the Code in his native country,
Cuba.
The work contains no notes. At the end of each chapter there is a brief
list of the special literature in the different countries bearing upon the
subject, and at the end of the third volume, there is a general bibliography
of the principal works on the Conflict of Laws. The Code Bstamante itself
appears as an appendix to the third volume.
Yale University. E. G. LoanNzrx.
What Price Jury Trials. By Irwin Stalmaster. Boston: The
Stratford Co. 1931. pp. 143. $2.
IF a preface is permissible in so simple a thing as a book review, I desire
to say that I hesitated to accept the invitation to review this book on the
ground that I disagreed with the author so thoroughly as to make it cer-
tain that I would be neither sympathetic nor ordinarily critical, but con-
troversial.
Failure to agree with distinguished professors, as for example my friend
Mr. Leon Green, recently professor at the Yale- School of Law and now
Dean at Northwestern, has not greatly disturbed me, for I felt that I had
had superior practical experience and that my conclusions were based on
actual knowledge, while theirs smacked just a little of cloistered seclusion.
But here is an author who has had a wide practical e-perience with juries,
and I confess to having seen the horrid spectre of doubt stalking rough
shod over what I thought I knew. (It was but an apparition!) In such
a time of doubt I turn for help, by force of habit, to that most engaging
and delightful of all philosophers, he who took his name from the breadth
of his shoulders, but his fame from the breadth of his knowledge, the depth
of his culture, the spread of his imagination, the width of his vision. Plato
points out that argument is both futile and unnecessary because it is born
of a failure properly to define the question and to state the issue. And
when I do so I find that we are not in hopeless disagreement. I will how-
ever follow the advice of Mr. John Keats: "Never argue,-whisper your
conclusions." First, what are we discussing? Then my whisperings.
The title of the book is "What Price Jury Trials." I have spent many
years with juries, as practicing attorney, as prosecutor, as a judge of our
highest trial court, and I have never seen a jury trial. If the author means
trial by-judge and jury, I have seen plenty. This may seem captious, but
a review of the book makes me believe it is somewhat fundamental. A trial
by "the first twelve men we meet on the street" [p. 6] uncontrolled by
trained legal minds, would be all he claims; a trial by a properly selected
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jury of substantial citizens, directed and advised and supervised by a well
qualified judge is quite another thing. And if the issue is trial by court
and jury in some distant jurisdiction then I am to be counted out, for I am
qualified to discuss it only as it exists in Connecticut and nearby states.
He says a sleeping juryman is a common experience. That jurymen may
be tempted to sleep through some of the cases we have (and how about
the judge?) is admitted, but that they actually do so is rare, not common,
and the judge sees to it that such a nodding is of a second's duration. And
he constantly talks of the judge as a mere umpire. Well, he ought not be,
and is not, here.
The author begins with a chapter "Dissipating the sacred aspect of the
jury trial" and he says much that is good sound sense. le seems to retain
juries in criminal trials, but thinks conditions have changed so that we
have outworn them in civil cases. I view the law and legal procedure as a
living growing thing, and desire to discard precedent when it ceases to be
helpful. But I am still convinced that History is a great teacher, and that
the wisdom of the ages is not lightly to be discarded. I am quite willing to
reject the jury system "if it no longer meets the present day requirements
of our complex life'--provided we substitute something better.
It seems to me that the book's argument as to remedy discards reform
or betterment and adopts the proposition that all judges are perfect, all
juries utterly bad. Now of course being human beings, there is no perfec-
tion and no utter badness in either. They each approach a happy medium
between these extremes. Each has its separate function, and each is, I
think, good in its own way. I shall discuss this again in my closing para-
graph.
The book discusses, "Civil Jury Trials-Past and Present," is satisfied
with the past, but thinks this "primitive machine" has broken down. A
chapter is devoted to the question whether an untrained person is competent
to try cases; another, the judge with and without the jury. It is true, as
he says, that a judge gets along very well alone in certain classes of cases
involving equitable matters. He argues that he would get along equally
well where he had to find the facts. He discusses "Jury Personnel" and Is
displeased with what he finds, and in another chapter thinks the jury sys-
tem has had a harmful effect on the lawyers themselves. He describes
various attempts at reform and thinks abolition is the only remedy.
The principal value of the book is, it seems to me, that it is written in a
practical way by a man who has had much actual experience. He offers
many specific facts and draws interesting conclusions. In his closing chap-
ter he quotes Mr. Charles E. Hughes and Mr. Elihu Root and seems to
conclude that they agree with his conclusions. I cannot find anything in
the quotations which remotely suggests such an agreement. It occured to
me to go over volume 112 of our Connecticut Reports, the latest one at hand,
and see what it revealed as to reversals and new trials, which are in the
book scored as an evil, and then laid by the author at the door of the jury
system. I find twenty-seven reversals of cases tried by judges alone, fifteen
reversals in so called jury cases. I haven't any idea what these figures
mean. Surely it would be ridiculous to say that they point to a conclusion
that juries are better than judges; a fretrie, that judges are better than
juries. I am just a little bothered to know whether it isn't possible that
some of the other conclusions arrived at in the book are equally far fetched.
John and Will were discussing legal matters. "Will, have you read about
the new machine just invented, which will infallibly tell when a man is
lying?" And Will replied, "Have I read about it? Bless your 'heart, I
married one of those machines." Many long years ago our Anglo-Saxon
legal system married just such a machine, the jury system, and taken by
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and large, it is still a happy marriage. It is not infallible, but as a fact
finding agency it is still the best machine we have. Facts are found by
weighing evidence, by deciding which witness is telling the truth-telling
what actually happened. A good jury is a fair cross section of American
life. The composite ability of twelve hard-headed, intelligent citizens to size
up a witness and decide what manner of man he is, in my very humble
opinion, surpasses that of a single man called a judge, splendidly trained
though he may be in the law. The jury'system has many faults. It can and
should and will be improved.
Superior Court of Connecticut. ARTHUn F. ELLs.
The Great Mouthpiece. The Life Story of William J. Fallon.
By Gene Fowler. New York: Covici Friede. 1931. pp. x, 403.
$3.
So long as we retain the jury system as a means of solving the criminal
problem of society we shall have "great mouthpieces." The term Mr. Fowler
uses is the gangster's current slang. It connotes great criminal lawyers.
The line reaches back to Cicero, comes down through Erskine and Rufus
Choate to the present. It is no ordinary calling. It is one for which men
are born and not made.
For many years the Positivist school in the field of criminal scholarship
has urged the abolition of the jury system and trial before judges espe-
cially equipped in criminology. They urge that the jury system was suc-
cessful in England because of the public attitude against crime and that
it has no logical place in the effort society makes to protect itself against
those who may not adapt themselves to the social unity. Any change in
the United States is remote in view of our constitutional tradition, the
increasing intrusion of politics into our legal system and the increase of
laws of universal application which are not in accord with the habits and
customs of some geographical parts. So by every prospect the great dramas
will go on and men with the ability to direct them will follow.
William J. Fallon was not least among those who have been great at the
criminal bar. He had the keenness of mind to ex-plain everything; the ready,
confident assurance and especially the power to see the details as a whole
and their influence as a whole upon the twelve human beings who were to
decide his failure or success.
His methods in these respects did not differ from those of Rufus Choate.
We have forgotten Choate's contemporary reputation. Was it not said by
Wendell Phillips that Choate made it safe for thieves to steal, and that
murderers drank to his health before executing their violent deeds? A ship
captain, turning state's evidence against his subordinate officers, when
pressed as to a conversation with the other defendants, replied: "He told
us there was a fellow in Boston named Choate who could get us out if they
found the money in our boots." Like Choate, Fallon had the great faculty
of squaring the whole evidence with a theory he could get the jury to
accept. In judging these men we often forget they are the necessary prod-
ucts of the system we follow in administering the law in criminal cases.
Mr. Fowler is successful in making clear this brilliant, impulsive and
generous personality. He does not gloss over the faults and we are left at
the end with a feeling of tragedy. It was not tragedy for Fallon because
he touched the points he sought to reach. His brilliancy and skill with
juries was a great talent of authentic worth. We must judge him there
and not by the faults which do not overshadow his strength. Perhaps if
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he had seen life differently and had been spared from so early a death he
would have brought his great gifts to a more altruistic use and devoted
them to social ends instead of individual needs. But Fallon never escaped
from the boy. Greater thoughtfulness might have come with years which
were not given to him.
Mr. Fowler gets the drama of the events and he brings in a general view
of the time. The life was worth writing as Fallon was of his time and
responded to it and was a part of it. Mr. Fowler was not able, as a layman,
to give an analysis of the trial lawyers' art as Fallon practised it. This
remains to be written.
New York P. P. FALION.
